This article historicizes the archive as a mechanism of exclusion. It focuses on three archival sites (the development of archival rationalization in the 19th century, national archives and the collecting of government documents, and the discipline of history) to analyze their shared logics of classification, identity, evidence, and authenticity. These three sites are connected through the author's attempts to research and write a history of the passport within cultural studies. The archive, therefore, provides a site from which to clarify what is at stake in the claims of cultural studies to be an interdisciplinary project.
A Visit to the Archive
It is Spring 2002, and I am on a public bus that is approaching the driveway to Archive II, the main branch of the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States (NARA), located in College Park, Maryland. As the bus turns into the half mile looped driveway, we pass the first of three armed checkpoints-today, all three checkpoints are staffed by older, gray-haired men with large aviator style glasses that make the men look comic and their guns more threatening. I get off the bus and approach the glasshouse frontage of Archive II carrying an umbrella that I had grabbed in the rush to get to the Metro for my daily 30-minute train journey, but with the sun having seemingly arrived for good, it appears redundant. I am also carrying and reading a newspaper bought to fill in the 50-minute wait when I missed my intended bus by the exact amount of time it took me to locate my umbrella. In addition, I have a laptop strung over my shoulder in a case that is doing bad things to my spine. After I enter the building and present my NARA ID card, I dutifully put my laptop on the conveyor belt to be screened. I also go to put my umbrella there, but the guard policing this part of the entrance examination is not interested in my umbrella. I can carry that through the metal detector. He wants my newspaper scanned. Only later does this surprise me. At the time, 2 weeks into my second visit to the Washington, D.C., area for research, I no longer waste any excess energy on my dealings with the guardian of heritage. The staff here, like all workers in documentary archives, knows the power of the printed and written word. They recognize the need to police the documents that enter and leave an archive and to control them once they have been admitted. At this point of entry, I guess they just do not know what ideas and opinions might be in those newspaper words. Maybe they are unclassifiable? More than likely, they are not worthy of being in this particular archive. The guard is definitely right; my newspaper needs to be scanned and its contents made transparent to ensure it can be assessed by the archive. My umbrella does not set off the metal detector.
The Problems of the Archive
I am at NARA to research my doctoral dissertation, a history of the emergence of the passport in the United States. After my morning security check, I spend the rest of each day scavenging through the archive's large collection of diplomatic correspondence and its smattering of Passport Office documents for comments and observations on the passport to go with what I have found in books, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, and congressional records. With each successful or unsuccessful hour at NARA, my thoughts wander to the collection of 19th-century and early 20th-century passport records and files boxed up in the State Department, to which I have been denied access; a denial that has caused me to again question what makes it into a state archive. It has also created my own form of dissertation angst. Can I do this project? Do I have a large enough archive to write a history? Why is this an issue for me? Despite my home in the field of communications, aren't I nominally a practitioner of cultural studies and therefore not under any obligation to the discipline of History and its rules of evidence and sources? 1 It seems I am not a disciplined historian. My university has defined me a nonhistorian in that most definite and painful way: as grounds to reject research funding. 2 So here I am, about to write a history from somewhere outside of History but perhaps not inside cultural studies, a position that therefore raises questions of method for the interdisciplinary project of cultural studies. Johnson (2001) argues that cultural studies "inherited from its humanities side a more relaxed or amateurish attitude to knowledge claims and a virtual silence on questions of method" (p. 273). If this is the case, what is the relationship of a supposedly interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, or transdisciplinary project such as cultural studies to established disciplines such as History? The decision to write an (or should that be "a") historical dissertation outside of history has made me very aware of the importance of the archive to the definition of this discipline. As Burton (2003) , a historian of the British Empire, argues, "debates about History versus truth, fact versus fiction, empiricism versus theory, are all corollaries of [the] contretemps over the archive" (p. 138). These debates have produced arguments about the need to historicize the archive, to "be cognizant of its horizons, wary of its distortions, skeptical of its truth claims and critical of its collaboration with state apparatuses" (Burton, 2003, pp. 139-140) . But how does one begin to historicize or problematize the archive? What about the archive, or rules of evidence, in a project such as cultural studies? Or more pointedly, to what extent is cultural studies deployed as a label for work that, despite all its claims to connect disciplines, is through amateurish attitudes and virtual silences, merely indisciplined?
To be clear, an archive is not only a discrete collection of documents. I also use it to label the sources of evidence that scholars use and the acts of classifying, collecting, and storing information. Therefore, a historicization of the archive offers an important site to begin thinking about issues of classification, sources, and evidence. These are issues that cultural studies practitioners often ignore as they deploy facts and borrow arguments seemingly without recognition of their disciplinary origin. More generally, the sociologist Thomas Osborne (1999) points out (and therefore preempts by several years the initial move for this article) the following:
Whether as notion, impression, concept or anti-concept the image of the archive is a useful focal point for bringing together issues of representation, interpretation and reason with questions of identity, evidence and authenticity; in other words, just those issues that tend to concern those who work on those kinds of problems that typically characterize the history and historiography of the human and cultural sciences. (p. 51)
Osborne's comments are well taken, but I want to raise these questions through more than the image of the archive and address the logics and politics of these practices through three sites that illustrate three different senses of what I have labeled the archive: (a) the emergence of archival rationalization and the modern passport in the 19th century, (b) NARA and the collecting of U.S. government records, and (c) the discipline of History and the authorizing of particular memories. Using a variety of styles (historical analysis, literature review, and anecdotal), I briefly discuss each of these to underline the logics of selection, classification, access, and interpretation that constitute all archives as mechanisms of exclusion. I also intend this historicization of the archive to ground an argument that the problems of the archive highlight the need for cultural studies to thoroughly question the differing concepts of evidence that its multidisciplinary projects draw on to produce knowledge and claims to truth.
Archival Rationalization and the Passport
The bespectacled, armed, older, White male employees of the state in the Archive II driveway make explicit the exclusionary practices associated with the archive. However, in the archive, there is not simply the researcher's problem of exclusion. There is also the more violent and effective exclusion of the memories and pasts of communities and peoples from archival collections and institutions, particularly from state-affiliated archives. As Burton (1997) points out, "clearly the politics of who or what is the subject of a 'national' history begs the question of how a subject becomes nationalized as well as what kind of disciplinary action such a process requires" (p. 238). This question can be partially answered through the historicization of state archives. A state archive works to articulate the nation and the state, to link them as the nation-state, and to offer claims and evidence for their shared story. These archives create national narratives and more importantly, national characters; in Burton's words, they play an important role in the nationalization of a subject. As I will use the concept of the archive to argue, archives and disciplines, along with nation-states that they make secure, are all gatekeepers.
The role of the archive in the disciplining and nationalization of a subject becomes more explicit if we consider institutional archives within a larger project that Sekula (1986) has labeled archival rationalization, "a process whereby archives became part of the quest for a 'truth apparatus,' which undergirded a variety of social practices" (Burton, 2003, p. 18) . Sekula argues that photography (his object of analysis), specifically instrumental modes of photographic realism, must be located in a broader context. Following Foucault, he labels this a truth apparatus that cannot be adequately reduced to the optical model provided by the camera. Instead, Sekula insightfully integrates photographic identification in a "bureaucratic-clerical-statistical system of intelligence" (p. 45). The central artifact of this sophisticated form of the archive is the filing cabinet. In this system of intelligence, the act of classifying, of filing, transforms the identity of the referent. This last point is more implicit in Sekula's article, but for my argument, it needs to be explicitly stated: To locate archives within a larger process makes it apparent that archives do not neutrally store documents, but rather in capturing them, archives transform objects into knowledge.
A key figure in Sekula's (1986) argument is Alphonse Bertillon, the French police official who promoted anthropometry, the scientific study of the measurements and proportions of the human body. Sekula positions Bertillon as a prophet of rationalization, akin to Frederick Taylor. He argues that Bertillon enabled photography to deliver on its archival promise through the creation of a system of classification that allowed untrained clerks to identify criminals with the efficiency and speed necessary in a modern world of telegraphs and trains. Bertillon's model, which reduced the multiple signs of the criminal body to a textual shorthand and numerical series, proved prescient for an emergent bibliographic science that "articulated an operationalist model of knowledge based on the 'general equivalence' established by the numerical shorthand code. This was a system for regulating and accelerating the flow of texts, profoundly linked to the logic of Taylorism" (Sekula, 1986, p. 57) .
The regulation and acceleration of the flow of texts produced what Matsuda (1996) calls the "memory of the state." This archiving of personal information is an active memory that materialized in the last decades of the 19th century as the modern practices of scientific administration (anthropometry, phrenology, fingerprinting, etc.) developed to police social behavior and identities, developments that Sekula places under the label archival rationalization. I have introduced Matsuda to emphasize the importance of archival rationalization to the development of the state in the bureaucratic age of verification, an age that articulated identity, evidence, representation, and authenticity to create peculiarly modern identification categories (e.g., nationality) and technologies to document them (e.g., the passport). The U.S. passport illustrates how in a period prior to the establishment of an institutionalized national archive, developing archival practices were articulated to a truth apparatus that sought to secure national identity and manage difference through citizenship. These identification practices are often thought of as verifying an individual's identity, an act increasingly recorded in identification documents. However, I want to bring the transformative practices of archival rationalization to the practices of verification to show both the policing logic constitutive of archives and how this enables the archive to be used to manage difference.
I label the passport a technology of verification 3 to make explicit the function of identification documents within a truth apparatus-the archive produces knowledge as it collects it. Following Miller's (1990) reading of Michel Foucault, I define a technology as "a way of representing and acting upon [italics added] processes and activities" (p. 333). A technology consolidates various processes and activities as an object, an object with integrity and coherence. The passport is not a technique; it is not a "neutral means of achieving certain ends without introducing any change of [its] own" (Miller, 1990, p. 333) . The passport is a technology of verification, for as Torpey (2000) recognizes, "nationality is an ascribed status that cannot be established without reference to documents" (p. 155). More explicitly, I argue that the passport verifies the true identity of the individual in part by producing the truth of that identity; the person is recognized as a national citizen through a centralization and standardization of identification practices. A historical analysis of the passport as a technology of verification illustrates that what are in practice read as objective practices of verification in fact produce the very criteria that they use to verify truth. Verification is a practice of comparison that for the purpose of an accurate identification, requires a fixed and stable identity to compare a person to. In this sense, the passport needs to be understood as a legal fiction. It does not verify an already existing identity but writes a new identity for the body. But unlike historic practices of identification (e.g., branding), it is an identity external to the body; identification becomes verification. In the late 19th century, the truth of that identity was increasingly invoked through official use of a series of legal documents that established the bearer as a citizen and developing forms of scientific identification that linked the bearer to the document. In writing a history of the passport, I use this critique of verification to analyze how the facts, statements, and citations that verify the passport as a legitimate and authoritative identification document are produced as true through claims to bureaucratic objectivity and "mechanical objectivity" (Daston & Galison, 1992) . This is one approach to a question that initiated my dissertation: How did governments come to believe that a sheet of paper could identify an individual accurately enough to secure the border of a nation-state? Sekula's (1986) concept of archival rationalization has been useful in ascertaining the conditions of possibility for the development of the modern passport in the 19th-and 20th-century United States. The passport as a modern identification document was developed as an archival technology-a technology that classifies and orders evidence in the service of the production of truth to be used to explain who we are and where we come from. As an archival technology, the passport makes it explicit that the varied and diverse archival practices that Sekula groups under archival rationalization are practices of verification that partially (in all senses of the word) structure the evidence used to produce the truth of national identity for the individual and the state. The fragile status of the 19th-century passport as an identification document depended on judicial records and bureaucratic claims of expertise and objectivity to produce citizenship as an administrative fact. The more rigorous archiving of intelligence about citizens, which Sekula (1986) and Matsuda (1996) highlight in France in the second half of the 19th century, appeared haphazardly in the United States. As the federal state sought to spread its authority west and south, the United States slowly developed a more bureaucratic, active, and interventionist state.
In the second half of the 19th century, when birth certificates were not issued and social status depended more on who you knew and not how you were known (identification categories), the increasingly inquisitive application process for the optional passport exposed a certain class of people (us) to a form of questioning normally designed to enable expert interventions into identified social problems (them). 4 Thus, passport blanks brought those who could afford the luxury of travel into the memory of the state. In the production of the 19th-century passport, the State Department used objective and expert witnessing of signatures, affidavits, and oaths that centralized the practices of individual verification. Through the introduction of these practices, officials sought to lessen the reliance on local "reputational knowledge" (Mnookin, in press ) and practices of self-verification to produce an "official identity" (Sankar, 1992, pp. 26, 29-30 ) that could be used to identify an individual in any future interactions with the federal government-a stable object that could be used for purposes of verification. The novelty of both dealing with the federal government and using documents as a form of identification frustrated many applicants, who in these requirements, perceived an official questioning of their honesty and the imposition of a particular identity over their claims to authoritatively state what they considered to be their personal identity.
As the passport application produced a stable identity for the act of verification, the boundaries of the category that the passport was meant to fix were still being established. The passport developed as an introduction to an identifica-tion document in a post-Civil War America in which, as Rogers Smith (1997) has thoroughly documented, the federal government actively challenged individual states to control which individuals could be excluded and included as a citizen of the United States. The passport assisted in the production of citizenship rather than simply verifying it. For example, the State Department, in the implementation of passport policy, had defined expatriation for 50 years prior to the legal authorization of its practices in the Expatriation Act of 1907.
Although the U.S. passport was produced through claims to objectivity, a history of the passport as an identification document illustrates the historically specific contexts in which practices of verification emerge. After the federal government took control of the administration of U.S. borders in the late 1870s, the tentative attempts to use passports and other identification documents revealed that until the outbreak of World War I, such documents were not considered to facilitate an accurate determination of an individual's identity. Immigrants were not required to carry identification documents, and officials generally ignored the documents issued to Chinese, who were exempt from the Exclusion acts. In the latter case, immigration officials trusted their own ability to verify the identity of Chinese merchants and students from physical appearance, not the absent authority of Chinese government officials and U.S. diplomatic agents distilled into what they considered a questionable document (Calavita, 2001; Lee, 2003) . It was only during and after World War I that an increased official perception of the value of identification documents produced sufficient enforcement of documentary evidence in the issuance of U.S. passports and visas for U.S. officials to trust these documents to provide a useful form of individual verification at the border. Officials trusted these documents to perform a specific role: to allow the state to remember people who crossed the border at official points of entry.
The Archon
The passport is a technology that assists in the production of identity categories, such as nationality and citizenship. I have drawn a link between the passport and archives to underline the exclusionary work of more traditionally understood archives (especially state archives) to secure national identities through the articulation of nation and state and the production of a new, national, identity; not the verification of an already existing identity. The archive ensures the continued existence of national populations by securing the borders of a national history and the actions of its characters. Therefore, the location of the passport within the larger process of archival rationalization emphasizes the latter's relationship to various state practices. This relationship could also have been presented through a reading of the opening pages of Archive Fever, where Derrida (1996) offers an etymology of the word archive. Derrida leads the reader via the Greek word arkhe, where things begin and where power originates, to the archon, the magistrate, and his house, his justice room, and his law books. The meaning of archive comes from the Greek arkheion, the superior magistrate's residence that also stored official documents. At this location, the archon exercised the power of procedure and precedent and enabled laws to operate through his right to interpret documents (Derrida, 1996, pp. 1-2; Steedman, 2002, pp. 1-12) .
Over the past 18 months, my thoughts have often returned to the archon. I now have a name for him: James E. Schwartz. I have been denied access to the archive that I understand contains the historical records that discuss the development of the passport as an identification document. Therefore, the archives of the passport, as well as the passport's history as an archival document, are critical sites in the argument of this article. Despite the fact that many of the documents in this particular archive date back to the 19th century, they remain in the possession of the Passport Office, an agency located within the State Department. Or more particularly, they are in the care of one long-term Passport Office official: James E. Schwartz. I discovered this after a month of phone calls to NARA and the Passport Office. An initial friendly phone call, in which Schwartz informed me that he had just completed an unofficial history of the U.S. passport, has been followed by no contact, except for a meeting that one of his superiors induced. It seems that the archon does not think that I have any right to interpret the documents in his archive-an archive that had been the Passport Office Library until the Passport Office apparently decided that precedent no longer needed such a detailed (re-)collection. Miss Francis Knight established the Passport Library in the 1950s early in her reign over the independent kingdom that was then the Passport Division. Knight, "the J. Edgar Hoover of the State Department" (Unger, 1977, p. 110) ruled from 1953 until she was forced into retirement in 1977.
It is not surprising that in the 1950s, the Passport Office still had a large collection of documents dating back to the early 19th century, if one considers that the United States only instituted a functioning national archive in the late 1930s. Although the United States had not followed the majority of European nations and established a national archive in the 19th century, there had been occasional moments of public concern about the preservation of historic government documents (especially those of the Continental and Confederation congresses) during that century. In 1810, Congress created a committee to investigate the state of government records and archives. The committee's suggestion for fireproofing some government rooms became moot when the British burnt entire government buildings during their occupation of Washington, D.C., in 1814. The subsequent rebuilding of the nation's capital did include designated storage rooms but not an official archive (McCoy, 1985, p. 2) . However, an archive existed in the form of an ordered collection of historical documents, at least according to Francis Lieber, who reported in his 1829 Encyclopedia Americana that "the archives of the U. States are easily accessible, and proper recommendation will open them to anyone who wants to use them for scientific purposes" (McCoy, 1985, p. 5) . This would have been surprising news to the State Department clerks, who regularly criticized the impossibility of locating historic records for administrative purposes, but perhaps they lacked the "proper recommendation" (Gustafson, 1970, p. 176) .
Public calls for a central archive amplified as fires in federal offices became more frequent (254 between 1833 and 1915; McCoy, 1985, p. 1) , the developing bureaucracy produced more records, and the number of experts outside of the government who needed a national archive increased. After its formation in 1884, the American Historical Association is credited with leading an organized campaign to centralize the government's historical records. In 1894, a member complained that the government had not "arranged, classified and calendared" its historical records, and the State Department had "no archivist who understands their management or has time to give to the needs of historical investigation" (Gustafson, 1970, p. 177) . There were also accusations of unequal access and favoritism being shown to East Coast scholars, particularly those from Boston (Gustafson, 1970, p. 177) . However, it took more than 30 years of false starts within Congress before appropriations for a national archive finally passed. The construction of a building began in 1931, and in 1934, 1 year before its completion, an act finally created occupants for the building. Therefore, the newly created National Archives Establishment had no say in the planning of the building it would occupy (Purdy, 1985, p. 20) .
After moving into the building, the National Archives Establishment developed in a tension between an initial perception of a dominant cultural function and its subsequent incorporation in 1949 into the newly established General Services Administration, "a mammoth service-oriented bureaucracy" (Bradsher, 1985, p. 52 ) that pushed the National Archives Establishment into a records management role (McCoy, 1978; Reingold, 1979; Walch, 1985) . During the National Archive's first 2 decades, the State Department followed the archival path of most departments: an initial reluctance to part with records meeting the reality of an increasing lack of space, especially after document production accelerated during World War II. By 1960, the majority of State Department records more than 15 years old were in NARA (Gustafson, 1970, p. 183) .
Departments are not obliged to send their old documents to NARA. The Passport Office has regularly sent passport applications to NARA but apparently retained most of its historical records as part of its library. Some correspondence regarding passport refusals, passport fees, and passport fraud appeared in NARA in the 1990s. This, along with the State Department's diplomatic correspondence, has occupied me in my time at NARA. But the internal memos, reports, and correspondence not sent to NARA remain in the possession of the State Department. Therefore, if a member of the public wants access to them, it is necessary to file a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA guide informs the reader that if you want a document more than 20 years old, it will be in NARA. This statement highlights the limitations of FOIA in my situation. I do not know what specific documents I want. I need to access this sizable collection of historic documents as if they were in a publicly accessible archive, by box number or lot number, not as individual documents. This resulted in what my FOIA case manager described as "a most unusual request," a request that two years later still has me at the behest of James E. Schwartz. As part of his work with these records, he had prepared an index for at least half of the collection. This 230-page index for 110 large archival boxes is crucial if I am to make a manageable FOIA request from what I would conservatively estimate is an archive of 10,000 documents. This is an index of declassified documents that apparently range from 50 to 150 years old. These are not the documents themselves, and because of the number of documents, their summaries must be very brief and general to amount to only 230 pages. But it is an index that Schwartz has spent 18 months (at the time of writing) working through to remove anything that might be considered a security issue or privacy issue. State Department officials keep telling me that issues of privacy have caused the delay. NARA archivists regularly remind me that dead people do not have any privacy and that people in documents who would now be more than 90 years old are considered dead and therefore have no privacy. As Having spent the past year successfully positioning myself as a victim, I have also had to recognize this is not any index. These documents are no longer in the Passport Office Library. They are a collection of boxes stored in an undisclosed location in the nation's capital. But more precisely, they are Schwartz's archive; it is his archive and his index. In sorting through it and (importantly) writing a history of the passport from it, Schwartz, the self-labeled amateur historian, created his own archive. In a part of the government where neither should properly be, the archivist and historian have combined, and it seems there is no one, no body, who can (or cares to) tell him what to do. Is this what happens when you create your own archive in an environment that values precedent but has limited use for a past that apparently offers no guide or example to present events and specifically for a past now contained in a narrative? There has been a noticeable confusion on the part of some State Department officials as to why I would want to write a history of the passport because Schwartz, in a labor of love, has already written the history of the passport, an as of yet unpublished history to which I have also been denied access. The history of the passport is not apparently his story; it came from the documents in front of him, and officials could not read or hear anything different from them. Schwartz has written an objective history, letting the documents speak the one story that they can in fact tell. This form of history does not recognize interpretation. Instead, it acknowledges a desire to tell the story of the past and an ability to do it through access to documents. The writer's authority comes from the fact that he or she has sat in the archive.
I have gained the impression that the failure to recognize interpretation leaves Schwartz believing that I am seeking access to his archive and therefore his story of the passport, which as the document-driven story of the objective historian is the only history of the passport. However, the Schwartz I have constructed makes explicit that in writing about the past, we produce our own archive; we do not merely sit in an archive. It is his story written from his archive. And like any archive, it has a politics of classification, of location, and of access. Having built his arkheion, the archon uses the power of the state to deny entry (please no passport to the archive jokes). But then, perhaps the sense of victimization I created, which produced this caricature of James E. Schwartz, is caused by my own archive fever. It is not Derrida's (1996) archive fever but rather the frustration of being denied access to documents and of spending weeks uncovering dead ends. In short, it is the problems and frustrations that archival research always promises. This is a fever that provides an explicit reminder that the historian (or the scholar, generally) and the archivist are always combined. The institutional archives that can produce this fever apply the same logic that we scholars do to our own work and perhaps as unreflexively as we often do. In research, we create our own archive; we follow rules of evidence to classify, structure, and exclude. However, unlike Schwartz, scholars affiliated to universities do have bodies that care to tell them what to do with their archives: funding committees, search committees, tenure committees, and disciplines.
Archival Memories
What are the logics of the archive in the discipline of History? History, as a modern concern, is an enterprise devoted to classifying, fixing, stabilizing, and authorizing memories. The production of truthful evidence and facts differentiates history from other forms of memory. In this sense, History is a positivist project within modernity founded on archival rationalization, and as such, it is useful to conceptualize it (in the terms of Sekula's [1986] Foucauldian argument) as a truth apparatus. In its purest form, the Historical archive produces a perception of reality as unproblematic. Reality is something out there, whereas the truth is most definitely in there (the archive). However, contrary to the prevalent cultural studies caricature of History as the ultimate unreflective positivist science, there are disciplinary debates over conceptualizations of evidence. These debates turn on attempts to articulate scholarship to the politics of the present and to historicize the archive.
The call to historicize the archive is to argue that it is not transparent but rather an effective mechanism of exclusion. In part, it is a demand to recognize that the archive functions in the present, to establish its relationship to the present, and to dispute any simple truth function that it is given. It is a challenge to established evidential paradigms.
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To look at the logics of an archive's construction, or its conditions of possibility, is to recognize that debates about evidence in History are about not only the subjects or contents of a particular archive but how memories are recognized as archival. Historian Carolyn Steedman's (2002) recent attempt to discuss the archive within History focuses on the former. She acknowledges that her collection of essays is more "about the practice and writing of history in the modern period" (p. viii) than the archive itself. This is significant. The strength of the essays is their discussions on how the archive is used to produce particular experts; she does not offer a broader interrogation of how archives authorize knowledge. However, neither the purported topic of the book (the archive) nor its actual topic (the writing of History) is explicitly located in the modern. Rather than interrogate the modern period, Steedman (2002) chooses to write about the practice of History understood within the Historian's encounter with documents and dust in the archive. She is interested in how Historians write the archive and how the archive gets into histories, not how particular documents get into the archive or how collections of documents become archives. For example, in an earlier version of one of the essays, Steedman (2001) explicitly exposes a very particular archival politics of location that is used to establish expertise and secure the discipline of History. The archive becomes a rite of passage, structured by the Historian's desire to get the right passage:
The [H]istorian's massive authority as a writer derives from two factors: the ways archives are, and the conventional rhetoric of [H]istory writing, which always asserts (through the footnotes, through the casual reference to PT S2/1/1) that you know because you have been there. The fiction is that the authority comes from the documents themselves, as well as the [H]istorian's obeisance to the limits they impose on any account that employs them. But really it comes from having been there (the train to the distant city, the call number, the bundle opened, the dust), so that then, and only then, you can present yourself as moved and dictated to by those sources, telling a story the way it has to be told. (p. 1176) This critique is produced by a contemporary politics of interpretation. However, in neither the article nor the book does Steedman (2001 Steedman ( , 2002 attempt to engage a Historical modern archival logic (of acquisition, classification, and location) that is hostile to interpretation, with the complex and contradictory relationships that exist among the contemporary politics of interpretation.
In another recent book on the archive, Burton (2003) questions how the discipline of History uses the archive to authorize particular memories as historical evidence. She argues that the home and domestic space need to be recognized as viable archives for the writing of History. This argument both questions the status of the archive in History and foregrounds how gender functions in the constitution of the Historical archive. Burton's (2003) Dwelling in the Archive challenges the way History has traditionally separated itself from memory through specific rules that question "the verifiability of the evidence produced in sites of memory like oral histories, letters, autobiographies and testimonies" (p. 23), sites where the voices of women are most frequently located.
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As this evidence tends to not be located in recognized depositories, it lacks the verification that the traditional archive gains from its association with state practices. Through this association individual testimonies, such as reports, memos, letters, and telegrams by state officials and employees, are more easily accepted as evidence of truth. Burton (2003) makes it clear that that her argument for domestic space as an archive is not to be read as a strategy to achieve "a more accurate, more 'truthful' History than we have had before" (p. 143). The archiving of the domestic is offered as a way to understand the conditions within which History must proceed, a history that recognizes that "all archives are provisional, interested, calcified in both deliberate and unintentional ways; that all archives are in the end fundamentally unreliable" (Burton, 2003, p. 26) and, I would clarify, political. She later argues the following:
Triumphalism about the capacity of [H]istory-including feminist [H]istoryto see all its subjects effectively reproduces the discourse of surveillance and total vision that underwrote colonial modernity and its political manifestations, [H]istory prime among them. Embracing it would require us to participate in the hubris of the panopticon rather than face the ultimate fragmentation and ghostliness of all archives: the final unknowability of home and history in their totalities. (pp. 143-144) This historicization of the archive, therefore, provides one way to productively understand the ongoing debates between social Historians and cultural Historians, debates that can be usefully positioned after the linguistic and cultural turns as "archive wars." These are not only debates about what constitutes legitimate evidence or the reliability of narrators, but more significantly, these are interrogations of the status of the archive. In this context, Burton (2003) calls into question the liberal emancipatory politics of much social History. If the archive, as it is normally construed, is not only partial but also complicit in the subordination of various groups, how can the kind of inclusionary or exemplary stories that liberal social Historians seek be produced? That is, the historicization of the archive punctures the fantasy of the total archive. This totality of vision is History conceived as a narrative, a practice, and a site of desire, the desire for truth telling and for the mastery of knowledge. The complex fetishization of the archive encapsulates this. But the history of the archive needs to be understood as the history of loss. As Burton (2003) argues, this recognition does not mean the end of History, for "loss itself is nothing more or less than the subject of history, in whatever form it takes" (p. 144).
It is significant that Burton (1997 Burton ( , 2003 ) is a Historian of colonial modernity. The question of the archive seems particularly fraught for Historians working in cross-cultural or postcolonial contexts, where questions about the status of History as an interpretative discipline and its relationship to the power of the colonial state are especially urgent. An increased attention to colonial knowledge and colonial disciplines has led to a fundamental rethinking of, and vicious disputes about, History as a discipline. In this work, modernity is an important and contested framework, but also, because various peoples have fought their exclusion from national stories and their positioning as "anticitizens of modernity" (Burton, 1997, p. 237) , the relationship between History and the nation-state is made explicit. Recent work in South Asian history has argued that the discipline of History itself, through British History writings from the 1760s, played an important part in the relationship between history writing, the company state, and communal identities (Ballantyne, 2001, p. 99) . Reviewing recent South Asian historiography through the problematization of the archive, Ballantyne (2001) has argued that "the implication of the discipline of History in colonialism" can no longer be ignored and "the recovery of subjectivity, so long the staple of historical analysis, now seems an uncertain project" (p. 104) Simply put, "historians can no longer imagine the archive as transparent" (p. 104). Foucauldian-influenced work in South Asian history has shown the following:
The manuscript collections, Parliamentary papers, court records, periodicals and newspapers used by the historians of South Asians are not simply documents that allow us to access the colonial past, but rather were constitutive of the multiple inequalities of that past. (Ballantyne, 2001, p. 93) This Historical work highlights the contested status of the archive and cultural History within the broader context of History as a discipline. It challenges a tendency in cultural studies to see History as still rooted in a rigidly empirical and ahistorical idiom that is only useful in providing the context or background for the textual analysis or theoretical work of cultural studies scholars.
Cultural Studies and Archives
What is the relationship between a discipline such as History and cultural studies? This is an increasingly difficult question to answer. Proponents of cultural History maintain a questioning of their discipline, and cultural studies continues to be a problematic and unclear referent. What is cultural studies? A political project that highlights a contemporary relationship between culture and power in the hope of offering gestures toward different possible futures? Although this is a potentially attractive definition, I have become increasingly reluctant to use cultural studies as shorthand for my work because of the increasing number of similarly vague definitions it attracts. I do not want to have lengthy conversations where I have to clarify what my work is not: a study of representations in popular culture, a perpetual search for acts of resistance, theoretical discussions based on a near but not close reading of French philosophers in English, and so forth. Perhaps this ambivalence is due to the luxury of spending most of my graduate education in a program that encouraged interdisciplinarity. The result, however, is that I now talk about specific ques-tions I am thinking and writing through or often just discuss the research object itself. I recognize that this in itself can be labeled a cultural studies move. There are some who somewhere in their definition of cultural studies as a political project will talk of it as an approach where the object determines the theoretical framework or the research method. This is one basis for the claim that cultural studies is interdisciplinary. But how do you do an interdisciplinary project? Sometimes, this still seems to be simply a hijacking of objects and practices, the residue of recovering practices and objects from high culture contempt. Often, interdisciplinary work becomes a useful label for an undisciplined workspace that provides for the safe deferral of problems of evidence and acts of exclusion, where it is constraints such as time and money that constitute the boundaries of an archive.
In 1990, as a coda to a conference paper, Steedman (1992) asked one of the first large cultural studies conferences a series of questions that addressed the problems of lazy claims to interdisciplinarity:
Why does cultural studies want [H]istory? What does wanting it mean? What new acts of transference will items from the past help cultural studies-or make it-perform? How will it be done? How taught? Will there be any room for detailed historical work; Or are students of cultural studies bound to rely on great schematic and secondary sweeps through time? Will there be any room for the [H]istorical case-study in its pedagogy? What good is it all to you anyway? (p. 621) Thinking about these questions almost a decade later, Morris (1998) wrote the following: "Wanting history I read for the theory and skip the facts" (p. 5). I read this answer as nuanced provocation. Morris's argument is explicitly not a question of History versus theory, which is her problem with Steedman's (1992) conference paper. She does not argue against the importance of theory to her work or that of cultural studies more generally. Morris makes these arguments to set up a discussion of the problems associated with writing about the (recent) past and contemporary representations of a more historic past. In this discussion, she muses on what counts as evidence in cultural studies, more particularly, how cultural studies as a field stabilizes its evidence. In terms of this article, what archives do cultural studies sanction, and what are the politics of its archives?
Though Morris (1998) frames her arguments on history and evidence through Steedman's (1992) questions of cultural studies, she begins with a question Grossberg posed in a 1989 article: "What do you do when every event is potentially evidence, potentially determining, and at the same time, changing too quickly to allow the comfortable leisure of academic criticism?" (Morris, 1998, p. 2). Grossberg's desire for a life of leisure is in part an archival fantasy. This is the visit to the archive, the endless time to ponder a definitive archive, the fantasy that Steedman has worked to dispel in her recent writings on the ordinariness of the archive. Grossberg's desire can also be read as that politeness that often greets Historians at interdisciplinary encounters when they are told that "any rigorous theoretical form or mode of inquiry needs a historical perspective, a proper historicity" (Steedman, 1992, p. 620 ). Morris identifies this as nostalgia. She argues that cultural studies is a field enabled by "the cultural concept" (theory; p. 5, 7), that it is a product of a general flight from disciplinarity and the historical.
This desire for historical perspective remains wistful. Morris (1998) contends the predominant tendency in cultural studies is to theorize, to use a narrative form "derived from the scholarly tradition of a 'History of Philosophy' in which a very few big events take place . . . over very long periods of time" (pp. 2-3). She is concerned with the tendency to use this theory to render questions of method redundant in a field that proudly defines itself through disciplinary relationships. Methodological problems in cultural studies tend, therefore, to be "accounted for rather than solved" as "symptoms of a broader cultural 'logic,' social 'condition,' or epochal 'moment'-postmodern, postcolonial, postindustrial, perhaps even posthistorical" (Morris, 1998, p. 2) . Morris argues the following:
When cultural critics agree to debate a (largely bibliographic) frame of reference in lieu of an object of study we in effect use a generic brand of "theory" to avoid asking questions about the status of objects, and differing concepts of evidence and determination in a multidisciplinary project. (p. 2) In my terms, the archive as a concept is therefore devalued along with the historical. This means that questions of how evidence is included and excluded are too often ignored. Practitioners of cultural studies need to recognize that there are rules of evidence and determinations in academic disciplines that need to be acknowledged when disciplined writings are brought into a multidisciplinary project "as a building block for a different structure of explanation" (Steedman, 1992, p. 614) . But what if this different structure of explanation is used to write primarily about the past, outside of the discipline of History? Morris (1998) is asking if it is possible to make historical claims without Historical rules of evidence? This alludes to one of her concerns with Steedman's (1992) separation of theory and History. Such a separation implies that outside of the discipline of History, there are only schematic and secondary ways of dealing with the past (Morris, 1998, p. 7) . Johnson (2001) , a Historian within the field of cultural studies, articulates this as the "difficulties [that] arise when history-as-a-discipline is identified with historicity as such. This devalues work in other disciplines on themes of historical process, conflict or contextual specificity" (p. 276). There are many non-Hisorical ways of engaging the past, and as I have indicated, these engagements (archival wars) are taking place in the discipline of History. If theory and history, discourse and reality, are not separated, their interdependence offers suggestions as to how cultural studies can think about the past. Johnson offers the following ways in which the study of culture outside the discipline of History can be historical: cultural formations of a very particular time, place, group, and milieu in a thickly contextualized way to show frameworks very different from our own; reconstruction of the discursive field for a familiar text or author; historical examples or case studies in pursuit of an argument; Foucauldian genealogies and archaeologies of knowledge and contemporary conceptions of the natural; and the history of history (pp. 279-280).
Johnson (2001) raises this point as he argues, perhaps optimistically, that in the past decade (in Britain) a definite transdisciplinarity emerged "where different disciplines have come to share a cultural agenda but pursue it in their own ways" (p. 278). Here, disciplinarity is not equated with exclusion. Disciplines are less a policing method and more a process of specialization. He stresses that transdisciplinarity is not an erasure of disciplinary boundaries but a recognition that all disciplines include knowledge and perspectives that should be available outside of a narrow band of disciples. But Johnson leaves too implicit the need to continually articulate borrowed knowledge and perspectives. It needs to be argued that cultural studies must explicitly make itself aware of the archival politics that secure disciplines to avoid its "virtual silence on questions of method" (Johnson, 2001, p. 273 )-borrowing in itself is not a viable methodology. My musings on the archive are intended as a step toward one possible framework to interrogate the practices that provide the project of cultural studies with much of its source material. As cultural studies scholars are increasingly encouraged to historicize their projects, it becomes critical to clarify exactly how rules of evidence in the borrowed sources fit in our individual archives. Do they stabilize or destabilize our object of analysis? The perception and evaluation of disciplinary practices and methods need to be part of the formation of cultural studies' project archives. Disciplines should not be reduced to a simple definition or agenda. Although such reduction allows for easier borrowing privileges, it hinders the development of informed and useful scholarship.
Although I believe that he leaves the problems of interdisciplinary work too implicit, Johnson (2001) is explicit that any borrowings should not reduce the complexity of the cultural to one definition or dimension or detach the agenda of cultural studies research from questions of power. He does not want a cultural study that is reduced to cultural History, media studies, or popular culture. But if one is to follow Johnson's call, how do you do historical work in cultural studies if it has to be more than cultural History? His list of historic studies of culture that fall outside of a traditional History are all examples of cultural History that are written under the contested sign of the discipline of History. However, Johnson would probably agree that not all of these cultural Histories would fit inside the contested sign that is cultural studies. To do that, I assume they would all have to be political. In cultural studies speak, they would have to be projects that intervene in the present, with the purpose of showing other possible futures. But long in History has the disposition been to defamiliarize the familiar. Although this is not as rigorously theorized a condition of possibility as the political in cultural studies, defamiliarizing can be used to effectively locate the historical project in the present. However, as Johnson's commitment to the complexity of the cultural indicates, the interest of cultural studies in the present is the relationship between culture and power. In one of the more useful articulations of cultural studies, Grossberg (1997) offers this relationship in opposition to a focus on the more limited relationship between culture and text (i.e., representation).
Therefore, cultural studies as a historical project needs to map the relations between culture and power. Its questions and answers must engage with the politics and power relations of the present. In this sense, it is a historical project that is as driven by its questions as its answers. It is not a history that seeks to narrate the facts it collects. Ideally, it should be difficult to skip the facts to get to the theory; the theory should be within the facts. Historical cultural studies is a history that makes arguments that seek to construct objects and practices through their historical discontinuity, but it is a history that never claims closure for them. A historical project that is cultural studies does not fetishize the archive. It argues its way in and out of archives as it follows specific practices and objects to challenge the politics of exclusion that have defined archives. A cultural studies historical project would recognize that the archive as a truth apparatus is also a technology of verification. This is a history that is not adverse to speculation. It thinks from institutional archives, not simply within them. This speculation can lead to something such as modernity being a key category. But it is this need not be the theoretical crutch that Morris (1998) has problems with because historical work in cultural studies does not need to be simply schematic and secondary. It needs to be based on historical research and thought that uses and contests modernity and so forth through an awareness of how such concepts structure the research object not only in its historical time but also in the logics of its archives. A concept such as modernity structures a historical object through its impact on evidence criteria, how evidence has and can be used in academic projects. This historical cultural study is being written from the discipline of History. Its challenges to that discipline are the cause of archival wars in History.
Such a historical project conceptualizes its archive through the logic of dispersion. In his call for a method for cultural studies, Grossberg (1997) Although I am quoting Grossberg somewhat out of context, I think his call for radical contextualism, along with the disposition in Morris's writings to satu-rate with detail an articulated point and place in time, is the framework from which an archival historical cultural studies can be effectively written. This is a project that does not deride speculation. The value of interdisciplinary work is that it should lead to disciplined speculation that challenges the reader. Toby Miller (Packer, 2003) contends that when reading cultural studies, one should turn the page and be surprised and that when you write cultural studies, "you are meant to make interventions, you are meant to annoy people, you are meant to grandstand, you are meant to be hysterical" (Packer, 2003, p. 27) . Although I want to agree with the interventionism that Miller advocates, I also believe that to be ultimately effective in that project, you need to be aware of the politics (archival or other) that have caused your hysteria or determined your intervention.
Conclusion
Burton (2003) argues that most professional historians "respect and even valorize the traditional archive on the one hand and [are] cognizant of its horizons, wary of its distortions, skeptical of its truth claims and critical of its collaboration with state apparatuses on the other" (pp. 139-140). To historicize the traditional archive through the process of archival rationalization makes explicit the wariness, skepticism, and criticism that Burton graciously grants her colleagues, and it foregrounds the consequences of the fantasy of total knowledge and truth that structures the traditional archive. Although the United States did not have a National Archive until the 1930s, it had institutionalized archival rationalization as a mechanism of exclusion in other ways prior to this. The development of the passport illustrates how emerging archival practices were articulated to a truth apparatus that sought to secure national identity and manage difference through the mechanism of citizenship, an articulation that the modern projects of History and the archive continue. Citizenship makes explicit the links between nation and archive and discipline that are critical to any historicization of the archive. The traditional state archive has the nation as its right and proper object, as does the traditional History written from it. But to articulate the archive with the nation and disciplines is to recognize all three as technologies of exclusion.
I believe that the stories of the modern archive's emergence as a truth apparatus connected to the developing nation and state, and its institutionalization in nation-states and academic disciplines, highlight the utility of the archive as a way toward critical assessment of the acts of thinking and writing within the academy. In one sense, I have explored ideas of the archive in various contexts to redeem the archive (and History) in cultural studies, to remind those who claim the label cultural studies that they use archives, and that there is a politics to their research as well as their arguments. If cultural studies is indeed a project devoted to contextualizing power relations in contemporary culture, then I believe that within the thinking of any cultural studies project, there needs to be an explicit recognition of the disciplinary practices and debates that frame facts, arguments, and meanings, whether they come primarily from archives or secondarily from the academic publishing machine. Cultural studies practitioners need to think how the ideas and objects they are describing, developing, or deriding have been disciplined. They need to ask, How and why has the lens of the archive been focused on this particular object? Notes 1. I use "History" to label writings about the past produced by the discipline of the same name. This differentiates this discipline from other writings about the past produced outside of the discipline of History. For reasons I outline later in the text, I use colonial and postcolonial History as an example of the discipline.
2. I submitted an application for my university's dissertation research grant that ended up by chance with a committee chaired by a History professor. When the committee announced its decision, I took up the invitation to inquire why my application had been unsuccessful. The chairman gave two reasons. The first referred to a lack of credentials as a Historian. It appeared that my equivalent of a British masters of philosophy in history was insufficient qualification to write a history, particularly when as a communications scholar, I had proposed a topic about neither newspapers nor broadcast media. His second reason further challenged my ability to construct a legitimate Historical archive as he questioned the viability of my intention to ascertain the conditions of possibility for the modern passport through a focus on the United States:
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "passport" was first used in its modern sense in English in the year 1500. Yet your research refers only to the U.S., and the questions had been answered before there was a United States, at least in part. (personal communication, October 23, 2001) I found it disturbingly ironic that the boundaries of a diachronic discipline were defended through a principle of timelessness. The function of the passport changed numerous times from 1500 until the appearance of something closer to what we now think of as an international passport system after World War I. For example, it was only from the end of the 18th century that passports were regularly issued to identify people, not ships. Although these comments provide an example of the dangers of basing one's historical claims exclusively on the Oxford English Dictionary, more importantly, the institutional effects of his comments present a pertinent reminder that as I will argue in this article, academic disciplines are more than perspectives on the world, just as archives are more than collections of information.
3. I would like to thank Vik Kanwar and Lacey Torge for helping me conceptualize the passport as a technology of verification.
4. The U.S. government required citizens to have passports during the Civil War, in the last few months of World War I, and following the U.S. entry into World War II. It was not until 1950 that the U.S. government required its citizens to have passports to leave and enter the United States in a time of peace. However, the requirements of other nation-states to carry passports after World War I meant that U.S. citizens had had to carry passports since 1920.
5. The archival turn is not limited to history. See Voss and Werner (1999) and the two special issues on the archive in the History of the Human Sciences (1998, 1999) .
6. Burton's (2003) arguments can be located within a genealogy of postcolonial feminist texts. Work within this strain of postcolonial feminism has continually emphasized the gendered nature of the constitution of the archive and therefore has actively shown how women's memories available in literature, letters, unpublished poems, in family homes, and private collections have been located outside the "true" and the verifiable. Crucial to this genealogy is Spivak's (1985) article on the Rani of Sirmur, a userfriendly, partial rehearsal of her more famous "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (Spivak, 1988) .
